Abstract. Computer security is severely threatened by memory corruption vulnerabilities, such as buffer overflows and format string bugs. Information flow tracking or taint analysis has proved to be one of the most effective techniques in defending against a wide range of such attacks. It works by tracking the source of each byte of data that is manipulated by the program, and detects attacks that overwrites pointers with untrusted data. However, current taint analysis based approaches are not very practical as they either require source code or non-trivial hardware extensions or incur prohibitive run time overheads. More importantly, they do not defend against non-control data attacks, making them susceptible to privilege escalation. In this paper, we propose Object Level Dynamic Taint Analysis, a very low-overhead information flow tracking technique. We propagate taint on contiguous chunks of memory designated as objects, rather than individual words of memory. Our experiments with several exploits show that Object Level Dynamic Taint Analysis effectively detects various types of memory corruption attacks, including noncontrol data attacks. Also, as it incurs modest performance overhead, it is practical for use in production environments.
Introduction
Attacks against computer systems have become relentless in recent years with attackers breaking into computer systems using a variety of techniques. One of the most common method to break into computer systems is to exploit memory corruption vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows and format string bugs. Worms and attackers make extensive use of such attacks to gain illegitimate access to a remote computer system. Slammer, the fastest worm ever, exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability in Microsoft SQL server. It brought down tens of thousands of machines within a few minutes and caused millions of dollars in loss [34] . Signature based scanning is often too slow to respond to these attacks. Hence, a protection mechanism should provide immunity to known as well as zero-day attacks.
Several approaches have been proposed in the past years to detect such memory corruption attacks. Approaches such as StackGuard [20] and Libsafe [45] target specific attacks such as buffer overflows. Many of them even require source code and recompilation of the program to be protected. Other approaches such as Address Space Randomization (ASR) [2, 11, 12, 46] and Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) [10, 26] are generic, but are easily defeated by brute force attacks in a matter of few minutes [40, 22, 42] . Several recent work [15, 32, 35, 43, 30, 37, 17, 18, 47, 21] demonstrated that information flow tracking, or taint analysis is a promising and effective technique for detecting a wide range of security attacks that corrupt control data such as return addresses or function pointers, even against zero-day attacks. The idea behind taint analysis is that in order for an attacker to change the execution of a program illegitimately, he must cause a value that is normally derived from a trusted source to instead be derived from his own input. For example, values such as jump addresses and format strings should usually be supplied by the code itself, not from external untrusted inputs. However, an attacker may attempt to overwrite these values with his own data. This technique works by labeling the input data from untrusted sources such as network as "unsafe" or tainted. The data derived from such tainted data is itself marked as tainted. An attack is detected when program control branches to a location specified by the unsafe data. Taint analysis is capable of detecting a wide range of memory corruption attacks. Previous taint analysis based approaches propagate taint on individual bytes of memory.
These techniques detect an attack if control is changed to a location specified by tainted data. Consider a case where a buffer is overflowed to overwrite adjacent memory that holds a boolean flag which indicates whether the user has been authenticated or not. By overflowing the buffer and overwriting the boolean flag, an attacker can gain illegitimate access without changing the legitimate control-flow of the application. Such an attack is easier to construct than the classical stack smashing attack, since no return address is being overwritten, and much more difficult to prevent since the previous approaches simply cannot differentiate between different variables in memory. Also, since no control data such as return address is overwritten, such an attack would go undetected by previous approaches. Such non-control data attacks have already been studied in the past [16] , and past research has shown that the implications of such attacks are same as those of control data attacks, i.e., complete system compromise. Also, the overheads incurred by previous approaches slow down the program execution several times, making them unsuitable for use in production environments.
In this paper, we propose Object Level Dynamic Taint Analysis, a very low-overhead information flow tracking technique. Instead of propagating taint on individual bytes of memory, we propagate taint on objects in memory. An object is a chunk of bytes that has a specific type and size. Our approach offers the following advantages over the previous techniques:
1. Does not require any hardware extensions. Many approaches proposed in the past require special hardware [15, 43, 18, 21] to propagate taint. Our approach does not require any such non-trivial hardware extensions, and therefore can be used in existing systems. 2. Does not require source code. Unlike some of the previous approaches [47] , our approach does not require source code of the programs that need to be protected. However, it requires programs to be compiled with debugging information in order to identify objects in memory at run time. 3. Ability to detect wide range of attacks. Our approach is capable of detecting a wide range of attacks including buffer overflows, format string attacks, integer overflows, double-free attacks and globbing vulnerabilities. None of the previously proposed taint-tracking based techniques defend against noncontrol data attacks [16] , in which an attacker targets a program specific data structure, such as a variable storing user privileges, instead of control information. Our approach can easily distinguish between different objects and therefore defeats non-control data attacks. 4. Very low overhead. Previously proposed information flow tracking techniques slow down program execution by several times [35, 17, 37] . Our approach reduces this overhead by an order of magnitude, incurring less than 4% throughput overhead for server applications and 1.8 times on average run time overhead for seven SPEC CPU2000 INT benchmarks, which indicates that our approach is practical to use for production runs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes some of the most common memory corruption attacks. Section 3 presents the technical description of our approach. Section 4 presents the experimental results on the effectiveness and performance evaluation. Limitations are discussed in section 5, followed by related work in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes the paper.
Memory Corruption Attacks
Memory corruption vulnerabilities arise when a program uses an unchecked external input. By providing a kind of input that the programmer did not expect, an attacker may cause the program to execute malicious code. The most commonly exploited memory corruption vulnerabilities include buffer overflows and format string bugs.
Buffer Overflows. In a buffer overflow attack, the attacker's aim is to gain access to a system by changing the control flow of a program so that the program executes code that has been carefully crafted by the attacker. The code can be inserted in the address space of the program using any legitimate form of input. The attacker then corrupts a code pointer in the address space by overflowing a buffer and makes it point to the injected code. When the program later dereferences this code pointer, it jumps to the attacker's code. Such buffer overflows occur mainly due to the lack of bounds checking in C library functions and carelessness on the programmer's part. For example, the use of strcpy() in a program without ensuring that the destination buffer is at least as large as the source string is apparently a common practice among many C programmers.
Buffer overflow exploits come in various flavors. The simplest and also the most widely exploited form of attack changes the control flow of the program by overflowing some buffer on the stack so that the return address or the saved frame pointer is modified. This is commonly called the "stack smashing attack" [6] . Other more complex forms of attacks may not change the return address but attempt to change the program control flow by corrupting some other code pointers (such as function pointers, global offset table (GOT) entries, longjmp buffers, etc.) by overflowing a buffer that may be local, global or dynamically allocated.
Format String Attacks. Format string vulnerabilities occur when programmers pass user supplied input to a format function, such as printf() or syslog(), i.e. using code constructs such as printf(str) instead of printf("%s", str). This input is interpreted by the format function as a format string, and is scanned for the presence of format specifiers such as %x, %s, %n etc. For each format specifier, corresponding value or address is picked from the stack and is read or written, depending on the format specifier. The common form of the attack uses %n format specifier, which takes an address to an integer as argument, and writes the number of bytes printed so far to the location specified by the address. Using %n format specifier, an attacker can overwrite the stored return address on the stack with the address of his own code, taking control of the program when the function returns. Other targets include address of destructor functions in DTORS table, address of library functions in the GOT, function pointers and other security critical data.
Integer Overflows. An integer overflow occurs when an arithmetic operation attempts to create a numeric value that is larger than can be represented within the available storage space. For instance, adding 1 to the largest value that can be represented constitutes an integer overflow. In some situations a program may make the assumption that a variable always contains a positive value. If the variable has a signed integer type an overflow can cause its value to wrap and become negative, violating the assumption contained in the program and perhaps leading to unintended behavior. If this value is then used an index to access an array, it can be used to access data stored before the array. Similarly, subtracting from a small unsigned value may cause it to wrap to a large positive value which may also be an unexpected behavior. Multiplying or adding two integers may result in a value that is non-negative, but unexpectedly small. If this number is used as the number of bytes to allocate for a buffer, the buffer will be allocated unexpectedly small, leading to a potential buffer overflow.
Approach Description
Previous taint analysis based approaches propagate taint on individual bytes of memory. Our approach is based on the observation that in a program, variables are the entities used by a programmer to accomplish any task, such as receiving user input, reading or writing files, arithmetic, etc. As a program executes, these variables might be copied among themselves (such as a=b), values of some variables might be derived from other variables (such as c=a+b), others might be received from user input (such as gets(str)), etc. An attacker may cause the value of one variable to illegitimately affect the value of another variable or control data by providing a kind of input that the programmer did not expect, such as an excessively large input, an out of bounds value, an input with format specifiers, etc.
By tracking the source of each variable, we propagate taint on these variables. We refer to these variables in memory as objects in our approach. We extract variable addresses and their sizes from the debugging information. By using binary rewriting, this information is inserted in the program binary as a new loadable read-only section, available at run time. At run time, we associate a tag with each object, that can have two values: 0 ("safe") or 1 ("unsafe" or "tainted"). The program is then dynamically instrumented to perform information flow tracking and to detect attacks that alter program control flow to unsafe data. All objects received from untrusted sources, such as network or command line arguments, are marked as tainted. As the program executes, the taint is propagated among objects. Any operation that results in an object being written, causes the tag of the destination object to be affected by that of the source object. Any attempt to branch to an address specified by a tainted object detects an attack. The overview of our approach is shown in Figure 1 .
This section presents an overview of our approach, including designating objects, dynamic binary instrumentation framework, tag management, taint tracking, exploit detection and optimizations for minimizing run time overhead. 
Designating Objects
The idea here is to augment the executable with information about the locations and sizes of variables, so that they can be identified at run time. To this end, the program must be compiled with debugging information. The next step is to rewrite the executable with the required information as an additional data structure in the form of a separate read-only section of the executable. This makes information about variable location and sizes available at run time. Our binary rewriting approach is built on top of TIED 1 [7] . If a program is compiled with debugging information, it contains variables location and size information that can be used at run time. TIED extracts location and size information of all the buffers in the program and dumps it in the executable as a separate loadable read-only section. DWARF 2 is the standard format for encoding symbolic, source level debugging information. TIED uses libdwarf consumer interface to read the DWARF information in the executable. It collects location and size information about the buffers used in the program. For global variables, the addresses are known at compile time itself, while for local variables only offset from the frame pointer is known at compile time. We have modified TIED so that it dumps the location (virtual address for the global variables and offset from frame pointer for local variables) and size information of all the variables in the executable. The members of arrays, structures and unions are also explored to detect the variables that lie in them. Figure 2 demonstrates a typical case of variables within structures. The modified TIED detects all 40 variables in this case. This location and size information is loaded at run time to identify objects in the virtual address space of the program. Note that in our approach, we treat control data stored contiguously (such as stored frame pointer and return address on the stack) as a single object. Figure 3 shows a code fragment and the corresponding objects that are created at run time. For the example code, the previous approaches would read the input up to 1024 bytes, mark the tag for all the bytes read as tainted and then propagate the taint to the destination. However, in our approach we mark the object src as tainted and taint is propagated to dest object. Therefore, for the same code, our approach marks an entity as tainted only once and taint propagation is required just once, thus saving taint marking as well as propagation effort to a large extent. 
Tag Management
In our approach, we associate a tag of one byte with each object and register, which can have only two values (0 for "safe" and 1 for "unsafe"). This is done to reduce performance overhead incurred by bit-masking and bit-shifting operations. However, using multiple-bit tag values significantly increases space overhead for storing tags. But since in our approach, a single tag is maintained for an object which can span several bytes, the space overhead is comparable to that with the use of single-bit tag values in previous approaches. Instead of maintaining tags for program's entire address space, we maintain tags only for writable parts of the program. This is done since the non-writable parts of the address space cannot be affected by the user input and are therefore assumed to be "safe". Hence, the tag for any object belonging to a read-only part of the address space is assumed to be 0 or "untainted". We store tags for objects in a separate memory region, called tag space (or shadow memory), which is addressable via a one-to-one direct mapping between an object and the tag-byte in the program's virtual address space. Such a direct mapping makes it straightforward and fast (with only one memory access and a few arithmetic instructions) to get the tag value for a given object. Note that, intuitively it appears that using a 1-byte tag for an entire object reduces space overhead. However, for a one-to-one direct mapping to be possible between an object and its tag, the tag is stored at a constant offset from the corresponding object, and therefore the space overhead is nearly the same as that in previous approaches.
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation Framework
Our dynamic binary instrumentation approach is built on top an existing dynamic binary instrumentation framework called Pin [33] . Pin provides efficient instrumentation by using a just-in-time (JIT) compiler to insert and optimize code. In addition to some standard techniques for dynamic instrumentation systems including code caching and trace linking, Pin implements register reallocation, liveliness analysis, code inlining and instruction scheduling to optimize jitted code. At program load time, our prototype uses the information dumped by TIED to identify objects in the process address space. For local variables, for which memory is reserved on the stack only when the corresponding function is called, this step is deferred till the corresponding function is called. Shadow memory is then created beginning at 0xA0000000 (Global Shadow) for writable non-stack regions (such as heap, BSS, etc.) of the program and at 0xA8000000 (Shadow Stack) for program stack. Shadow memory is allocated separately for stack and non-stack regions since they grow in opposite directions. Creating separate shadow memory for stack and non-stack regions ensures that the tags for objects in the respective regions can be addressed via a one-to-one direct mapping by adding or subtracting a constant offset. Figure 4 shows the process address space when it is instrumented in our approach. We then analyze the program statically to find instructions that refer to the objects in memory. Each such instruction is instrumented to perform taint tracking. 
Taint Tracking
At the beginning of a program, all tags are cleared to zero. Data (objects) received from untrusted sources such as network or standard input are marked as tainted. As the program executes, other objects may be tagged as tainted via information flow. A tainted object may become untainted if its value is reassigned from some untainted object. We instrument all data movement and arithmetic instructions.
-For data movement instructions such as mov, lods, stos, push, pop, etc, the tag value of the source operand is propagated to that of the destination. For data movement instructions which move a constant value in an object, we instrument the instruction to mark the object as untainted at run time.
-For arithmetic instructions, such as add, sub, xor, etc, the tag value of the destination is the OR of the tag values of the source operands, since the value of the destination is affected by both the source operands. -For instructions which do not involve any second operand (explicit or implicit), such as inc, dec, etc, the tag value does not change.
mov 0 x$10 ,% eax movb $0x0 ,0 x32bb00 (% eax ) mov $0x0400h ,% ebx mov 0 x32bd88 ,% edx mov (% ecx ) ,% eax sub % edx ,% eax mov 0 x32bbc8 ,% edx add % edx ,% eax mov 0 x32bae0 ,% edx movzbl (% eax ,% edx ,1) ,% eax mov $0x10 ,% edx or % al ,0 x32bb00 (% edx ) add (% ecx ) ,% ebx mov $0x2 ,% edx mov % ebp ,% eax sub % edx ,% eax mov 0 x32cbc4 ,% edx movzbl 0 x4000fffd (% edx ,% eax ,1) ,% edx mov $0x12 ,% eax mov % dl ,0 x32cb00 (% eax ) mov 0 xffffffec (% ebp ) ,% ecx These rules are not applicable for a few special instructions for which the result is untainted irrespective of whether the operand is tainted or not. For example, in x86 architecture, the instructions such as "xor %eax, %eax" or "sub %eax, %eax" clear the eax register irrespective of its previous value. In our approach, we identify such instructions and mark the corresponding register as untainted. We instrument calls to functions that allocate memory such as malloc() to identify corresponding object in global shadow memory. Calls to functions that copy memory such as memcpy() or strcpy() are instrumented to propagate taint from the source object to the destination object. Calls to functions such as memset() are instrumented to mark the corresponding argument as untainted if the source byte lies in an untainted object. For mmap or mmap2 system calls, we check the return value to see if the allocation was successful. For each successful allocation, we identify objects in the global shadow memory. To propagate taint for partial assignments, our approach classifies any reference to an address that lies in the bounds of an object as an access to the object. Since a single tag is used for an entire object, an assignment, whether partial or complete, will propagate the taint information from source object to the destination object. Figure 5 shows the code generated for propagating taint. The first listing in the figure shows the code generated for the instruction mov $0x0400h,%ebx. Here the register ebx is marked as untainted as a constant value is assigned to it. The second listing shows the code generated for an add instruction with an indirect addressing. Here the instruction is instrumented to mark the tag of the ebx register to be the OR of the tags of object being referred and ebx register. In the third listing, the value of a local variable is assigned to ecx register, which is instrumented to propagate taint from the local variable to ecx register.
Exploit Detection
We use configurable policies to detect any exploitation attempts. A policy specifies the sources that are untrusted, for example, network, files, standard input, command line arguments, environment variables, etc. Any data object received from an untrusted source is marked as tainted. A policy also defines the checks that are applied when the program is run. We use two policies -a default policy and a fine grained policy. In either policies, we mark data objects received from any external source such as network as tainted. The default policy is designed to defeat all control flow hijacking attacks and format string attacks. We instrument all control altering instructions such as call, jmp, ret, etc. and check the branch address. A branch address belonging to a tainted object detects a control hijacking attack. To detect format string attacks, we instrument calls to functions in the printf, syslog, and warn/err family. A format string belonging to a tainted object detects a format string attack. Fine grained policy is designed to detect all attacks that cannot be detected by the default policy. It checks whether any non-control objects are marked as tainted in an illegitimate manner. For example, a stack overflow attack that does not overwrite the stored return address, but only overwrites the next object on the stack will be missed by the default policy, but will be detected by the fine grained policy. We check the following to detect any exploitation attempts.
-Branch Addresses. The default policy checks if any address is used as a target of any branch instruction such as jmp or call. This defeats all those attacks which overwrite return addresses, function pointers, global offset table (GOT) entries, etc. in order to redirect the program control flow to the injected code or to some library function such as execve(). It also defeats frame faking attacks that overwrite the stored frame pointer in order to create a fake stack frame when the function returns. These checks are implemented by instrumenting all control flow altering instructions such as call, jmp, ret etc. -Format string arguments. The default policy also checks if any format function such fprintf() or syslog() is called with a tainted format string argument. Any such case is identified as an exploitation attempt irrespective of the format specifiers used. Therefore, it can not only defeat attempts to overwrite arbitrary memory locations, but even arbitrary memory read attempts. Note that such a check can not only detect an exploitation attempt, but can also pinpoint the vulnerability even before it is exploited. This is because the format string argument will still be tainted even if the input is legitimate. These checks are implemented by instrumenting all format functions in the printf, syslog and warn/err family. -System call arguments. We instrument system calls for several purposes. In Linux x86 architecture, a system call is implemented using software interrupt 0x80. The system call number is usually passed in the eax register. We instrument all int 0x80 instructions to check the value of eax register at run time.
For execve system call, we check at run time if its arguments are tainted. Such checks will not only defeat code injection attacks, but even those attacks in which an attacker overwrites data that is later used as an argument to a system call. These checks are disabled in the default policy, but enabled in the fine grained policy. -Other control data. The default policy also checks whether certain other control data such as boundary tags in heap or longjmp buffer are tainted. Such tags are inserted at points where these control data are used. For example, for boundary tags in heap, we insert checks in calls to free(), and for longjmp buffers, we insert checks in calls to longjmp() and siglongjmp(). -Non-control data. In the fine-grained policy, we check if any non-control data is marked as tainted in an illegitimate manner, such as by an overflow of an object. Such checks are implemented by checking bounds of the object being written, as done by previous approaches such as LibSafe [45] or LibSafePlus [7] .
Optimizations
To minimize the run time overhead associated with taint tracking and dynamic binary instrumentation, we statically analyze the program at load-time to identify references to local or global variables. References to the local variables can be identified by checking the operand of an instruction. Operands specified as an offset from the frame pointer are identified as stack variables. A negative offset from the frame pointer specifies a local variable of the function being analyzed, and a positive offset identifies an argument to the function or a local variable in a higher stack frame. Global variables are identified from their addresses which are known at the compile time itself. The instructions referring to these variables are then instrumented to perform taint propagation during run time. For addresses which are dereferenced at run time, we defer the instrumentation of corresponding instructions till run time. Static analysis eliminates the need to perform analysis during run time to a large extent.
Evaluation
We have implemented a prototype of our approach on Linux x86 architecture. We use TIED to dump variable size and location information into the program executable. Our prototype then uses Pin to instrument the code by adding instructions to perform information flow tracking on these objects and to detect attacks. The instrumentation is performed only once, at the program load time. However, the instrumented code may run many times. Pin caches the generated instrumented code, so that it need not be instrumented again when required.
We conducted a series of experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and performance of our approach. All tests were run in single user mode on a Pentium-4 3.2 GHz machine with 512 MB RAM running Linux kernel 2.6.18. All programs were compiled with gcc 4.1.2 and linked with glibc 2.3.6.
Effectiveness Evaluation
We tested the effectiveness of our approach using several synthetic and actual exploits. The exploits were selected from a wide range of attacks including stack smashing attack, heap overflow, format string attack, double free and non-control data attacks. Our approach successfully detected all the exploitation attempts and terminated the victim program to prevent execution of malicious code. The results are presented in Table 1 .
Synthetic Exploits. In this section, we evaluate our approach using synthetic exploits on stack overflows, heap overflows, and format string vulnerabilities. Our approach successfully detected all the attacks without any false negatives.
-Stack Smashing Attack. To test the effectiveness of our approach against the classical stack smashing attack, we wrote a program with a buffer overflow vulnerability. It uses strcpy() to copy a command line argument to a local buffer. We tried inserting a long command line argument in order to overflow the buffer and to overwrite the stored return address. Our approach successfully detected the tainted return address (which is treated like any other control data in our approach) when the function returned. -Heap Overflow Attack. In a similar test, we verified our approach by detecting a heap overflow. We wrote a program with a heap overflow vulnerability. It allocates a buffer in heap, uses strcpy() to copy the first command line input into the buffer, and then frees the buffer. We injected a huge input in the first command line argument in order to overflow the buffer and overwrite the boundary tags. Our approach successfully detected the tainted boundary tags when the buffer was freed. -Format String Attack. We used our approach on a custom written program with a format string vulnerability. The program uses printf() to display the first command line argument. The exploit for the program uses the format string attack to overwrite the global offset table (GOT) entry for exit() function. The exploitation attempt was successfully detected as the format string argument was found to be tainted. Note that for a format string attack, our approach can defeat all exploitation attempts of writing to and reading from arbitrary memory locations irrespective of the format specifier used. -Buffer Overflow Attack. To test our approach against non-control data attacks, we tried overflowing a buffer in a structure in order to overwrite a character array stored next to it. The character array is used to hold the filename of the temporary file being written. The attack was detected by the fine grained policy as the character array was found to be illegitimately written by a tainted buffer.
Actual Exploits. We tested our approach on five exploits on publicly known vulnerabilities. All the attacks were successfully detected by our approach.
-Samba call trans2open() Buffer Overflow. Samba version 2.2.8 and earlier suffer from a stack smashing vulnerability [?] in call trans2open() function. Successful exploitation of the vulnerability allows a remote attacker to gain a root shell on the machine running vulnerable version of samba. Our approach detected the tainted stored return address and defeated the exploitation attempt.
-BIND 8 Buffer Overflow. BIND version 8.2 and earlier suffer from a buffer overflow [36] in the nslookupComplain() routine, which allows a remote attacker to gain root access on the affected machine. Our approach correctly detected that the return address is tainted and defeated the attack. -xlockmore Format String Vulnerability. xlock version 4.16 suffers from a format string vulnerability [13] when using the command line argument -d, that can be used by a local user to gain root privileges. The exploit overwrites the stored return address with the address of the injected shellcode. Our approach successfully identified that the stored return address was tainted and defeated the exploitation attempt. -PHP Session Decode() Double Free Memory Corruption Vulnerability PHP version 4.4.5 and 4.5. 6 suffer from a double free vulnerability [23] , that can be used by a local user to execute arbitrary code in the context of the webserver or to cause denial of service conditions. The exploit overwrites the pointer to a destructor with a junk value to cause denial of service. Our approach successfully identified that the pointer to destructor was tainted and defeated the exploitation attempt. -SIDVault Simple Bind() Function Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability SIDVault version 2.0e and earlier suffer from a buffer overflow [4] , that can be used by a remote user to gain root privileges. The exploit overwrites the stored return address with the address of the injected shellcode. Our approach successfully identified that the stored return address was tainted and defeated the exploitation attempt. -ghttpd Log() Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. A stack overflow vulnerability [1] exists in ghttpd version 1.4.3 and lower which allows a remote user to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the web server. The overflow occurs in Log() when the argument to a GET request overruns a 200-byte stack buffer. In order to test our approach against non-control data attacks, we modified the publicly available exploit to overwrite the stored ESI register on the stack, which is a later copied to a pointer to the URL requested by the client. By overwriting the stored ESI register, it is made to point to the URL /cgi-bin/../../../../bin/sh in order to execute a shell. Our approach correctly detected the argument to the execlp() was tainted and defeated the attack. -wuftpd SITE EXEC Format String Vulnerability. wuftpd version 2.6.0 and earlier suffer from a format string vulnerability [44] in SITE EXEC implementation that allows arbitrary code execution. We modified the publicly available exploit for this vulnerability to overwrite the cached copy of user ID pw->pw uid with 0 so as to disable the server's ability to drop privileges. The attack was detected as the format string argument was found to be tainted.
Performance Evaluation
To test the performance overhead of our approach, we used our approach on several CPU intensive programs:
-bc -bc is an interactive algebraic language with arbitrary precision, with several extensions including multi-character variable names, and full Boolean expressions. The test was to calculate the factorial of 600. -Enscript -Enscript converts ASCII files to PostScript, HTML, RTF or Pretty-Print and stores generated output to a file or sends it directly to the printer. The test was to convert a 5.5 MB text file to postscript. -Bison -Bison is a general-purpose parser generator that converts a grammar description for an LALR (1) context-free grammar into a C program to parse that grammar. The test was to parse a bison file for C++ grammer. -gzip -Gzip is the standard file compression utility. The test was to compress a 12 MB file.
All tests were performed multiple times and averages of these were taken. We compare our results to that of Xu et al's approach, which has the lowest overhead among all the previous approaches. Our approach incurred an average overhead of 37.2% while that of Xu et al's approach was 76%, which clearly shows an improvement by an order of magnitude. The test results are presented in Table 2 . if(x==0) y=0; if(x==1) y=1;
The above code fragment is equivalent to the assignment y=x. Therefore, if x is tainted (untainted), y is tainted (untainted) as well, although there is no direct assignment from x to y. But since the value of y is assigned from a constant, it would be marked as untainted, irrespective of the tag of x. Our approach supports some of such basic implicit information flows, such as the use of translation tables, which are sometimes used for decoding using table lookps, such as y = table [x] . In such a case, the array index x determines the value of y. To handle such cases, our approach marks the result of an array access as tainted (untainted) whenever the index is tainted (untainted). Much more complex implicit flows can be supported using a notion of noninterference, which however is too conservative and leads to high false positives.
Protection of Shadow Memory. With our design, the shadow memory becomes a critical area that must be protected from malicious access. Our shadow memory mapping strategy can prevent attackers from directly modifying shadow memory as long as the attackers' code is under the control of Pin. The reason is that when attackers issue an instruction to access an address addr in the shadow memory, the instrumented code will access memory at addr+shadow base, which is beyond the boundary of the shadow memory area. This will cause an invalid memory access exception. Note that an attacker might try to access the shadow memory by using a large value of addr so that addr+shadow base overflows the 32-bits of the integer used to hold the sum. To counter such attacks, we check if the sum addr+shadow base leads to an overflow condition.
Limitations. Our approach is built on top of TIED. Although TIED does not require source code of the programs, it requires them to be compiled with debugging information. A limitation of our approach is that it does not work for stripped binaries, i.e. programs without debugging and other symbol table information. However, we believe it is not such a major limitation as many operating systems distributions, for example Microsoft Windows family of operating systems, are shipped with programs compiled with debugging information. Other operating systems such as Redhat family of operating systems make debugging information available as separate packages. Moreover, some approaches [8, 9] have been proposed in the past that try to discover variables in stripped binaries. We believe using a similar technique would make our approach independent of the debugging information present in the executables, making it work even for stripped binaries.
Related Work
Detection of Memory Corruption Attacks. Several approaches have been proposed to defeat memory corruption attacks. Approaches such as StackGuard [20] , StackShield [5], ProPolice [24] and LibSafe [45] and TIED-LibSafePlus [7] try to defend against buffer overflows. Other approaches like FormatGuard [19] , FormatShield [29] , LibFormat [39] , Kimchi [48] , Lisbon [31] , White-Listing [38] defend against format string attacks. These approaches are limited to certain types of vulnerabilities or exploits, and many of them even require source code of the programs to be protected. Recently, more general techniques based on randomization have been developed, that promise to defend against most memory corruption attacks. Address Space Randomization [2, 11, 12] randomizes the location of various memory segments and other security critical structures, making it hard for an attacker to guess the correct address. For the Intel x86 architecture, PaX ASLR provides 16, 16 and 24 bits of randomness for the executable, mapped and stack areas respectively. However, many successful derandomization attacks against PaX have been studied in the past [40, 22] , that defeat it in a matter of minutes. Instruction Set Randomization (ISR) [10, 26] is another generic defense technique that defends against code injection attacks by randomizing the underlying instruction set. Since the attacker does not know the randomizing key, his injected code will be invalid for the injected process, causing a run time exception. However, overheads associated with ISR make it an impractical approach to defend against such attacks. Address Space Layout Permutation (ASLP) [27] permutes the location of various segments in the address space. However, it does not allow stack frame randomization, making it vulnerable to return-to-libc attacks. Program Shepherding [28] is a run time monitoring system that keeps track of whether code has been modified since it was loaded from disk, and checks each control transfer to ensure that the destination is to a basic block that has not been modified. However, it does not defends against many return-to-libc attacks, in which an attacker overwrites a function pointer or return address to an address of a library function. Also, due to the nature of the C language, the above methods cannot detect certain kinds of attacks, for example, overflows from an array within a structure to an adjacent variable. Object level taint analysis can capture these attacks whenever corrupted data is used in a sensitive operation.
Information Flow Tracking. Static taint analysis has been used to find bugs in C programs [41, 25, 49] or to find potential sensitive data in Scrash [14] . Perl [3] does run time taint checking to see whether data from untrusted sources are used in security-sensitive ways such as as argument to a system call.
TaintBochs [18] , Suh et al [43] , Chen et al [15] and Minos [21] perform taint tracing at the hardware level. TaintBochs [18] is built on top of the open source IA-32 simulator Bochs. It is a tool based on whole-system simulation analyzing how sensitive data are handled in large programs. Suh et al [43] propose an information tracking approach that tracks spurious information flows and restricts their usage. Minos [21] is a microarchitecture that implements Biba's low watermark integrity checking on individual words to detect attacks at run time. Chen et al [15] defeat memory corruption attacks using an architectural support that detects attacks when a tainted pointer is dereferenced. Their approach can defeat non-control data attacks. The main limitation of these systems is that they require specialized hardware. Without this custom hardware, hardware emulators can be used but performance becomes unacceptable.
Binary instrumentation for taint-tracking was first used in TaintCheck [35] . While effective in attack detection, their approach slows down programs significantly (by about 37x). TaintTrace [17] achieved significantly faster taint-tracking by using more efficient instrumentation based on DynamoRIO, combined with simple static analysis for eliminating redundant register saves and a shadow memory data structure that speeded up metadata access. LIFT [37] achieved significant additional performance benefits by using better static analysis and faster instrumentation techniques. Although all of these approaches detect a wide range of memory corruption attacks, none of them defends against non-control data attacks, rendering them vulnerable to privilege escalation.
The key distinctions between our work and previous taint-analysis based approaches [15, 32, 35, 43, 30, 37, 17, 18, 47, 21] were already discussed in the introduction, so we limit our discussion to more technical points here. As mentioned earlier [15, 43, 18, 21] rely on hardware support for taint tracking. Other approaches such as [35, 30, 37, 17, 32] do not defend against non-control data attacks. [47] is closer to our technique than other techniques. However, it assumes the presence of source code, and needs recompilation of the programs to be protected, and therefore cannot be used where source code in unavailable, such as COTS software or Microsoft Windows applications, which limits its applicability. Our approach does not require source code and mitigates this limitation using binary rewriting.
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we presented a novel approach of propagating taint to detect memory corruption attacks. Our approach propagates taint on objects in memory. Attacks are detected when a tainted object is used in a security-sensitive operation or when a tainted control-data is used. Our evaluation represent a substantial improvement in performance over that reported by previous works on taint tracking. Also, our approach can detect a wide range of memory corruption attacks, including non-control data attacks. However, the present implementation requires the programs to be compiled with debugging information. Therefore, the future work involves eliminating this limitation in order to make it work even for stripped binaries.
